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A FURTHER NOTE ON FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
John F. Preis∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It’s hard to disagree with someone who mostly agrees with you, but I 
will try my best. In his review of my article addressing the relationship 
between the federal cause of action and rights, remedies, and 
jurisdiction,1 Professor Lumen Mulligan pays my article several 
compliments.2 In this, I fully agree with him. But the wise Professor 
Mulligan also attempts to point out some errors in my analysis. On these 
points, I must mostly voice my disagreement.  
Let me begin by very briefly recounting the gist of my article.  In the 
article, I attempt to define a federal cause of action, and describe its 
relationship to federal rights, remedies and subject matter jurisdiction. 
Federal courts throw these terms around so often—and so erratically—
that considerable confusion has arisen.3 Confusion between terms is not 
necessarily a major problem (our society can generally survive without 
knowing the difference between a sofa and couch), but when such 
confusion finds its way into the law, serious problems arise. If a cause 
of action is deemed “remedial,” for example, then courts will tend to 
make causes of action available to the degree that remedies would be 
available.4 In contrast, if causes of action are “jurisdictional,” courts 
will tend to make them available according to jurisdictional rules.5 The 
upshot here is that the availability of a federal cause of action will be 
affected by how we define it. It is thus essential to define it correctly 
and my article is an effort to do so. 
In the article, I argue that federal causes of action ought to be treated 
as (1) distinct from substantive rights, (2) synonymous with the 
availability of a remedy (but not whether a remedy will in fact issue) 
and (3) distinct from subject matter jurisdiction (unless Congress 
instructs otherwise).6 This thesis is built principally on a historical 
recounting of the cause of action from eighteenth century England to 
twenty-first century America.7 In taking an historical approach, I did not 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.  
 1. John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and 
Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849 (2015).   
 2. Lumen N. Mulligan, We Should Use ‘Cause of Action’ More Carefully: A Review of 
John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies and Jurisdiction, 
67 FLA. L. REV. F. 42 (2015). 
 3. See Preis, supra note 1, at 854–64 (tracing the relationship of federal causes of action 
and rights, remedies, and jurisdiction).   
 4. See id. at 868. 
 5. See id. at 870. 
 6. Id. at 852–53. 
 7. Id. at 852. 
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mean to argue that federal courts are bound to adhere to centuries-old 
conceptions of the cause of action. I merely used history to show why 
the cause of action has taken on various identities and, further, why 
these identities have changed over time. By closely attending to these 
changes, we can better determine whether linguistic changes signal 
substantive changes in doctrine, or are simply loose language.   
Professor Mulligan, as I noted at the outset, generally applauds my 
diagnosis of the problem as well my chosen remedy, but he does take 
issue with my conclusions in two respects. First, he disputes my claim 
that the cause of action can be jurisdictional in sovereign immunity 
cases.8 Second, he disputes my claim that “the cause of action has been, 
and remains today, remedy specific.”9  I will address each of his 
concerns in turn. 
I.  THE CAUSE OF ACTION, JURISDICTION AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Although I briefly outlined my arguments above, it is necessary to 
explore my jurisdictional claims in a bit more detail before responding 
to Professor Mulligan. In my view, the federal cause of action should 
generally be considered distinct from jurisdiction. Thus, a plaintiff who 
alleges a violation of federal law but lacks a federal cause of action 
should have her claim dismissed on the merits, not dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.10 This standard rule is subject to an exception, however. I 
explained in the article that the existence (or not) of sovereign 
immunity—a jurisdictional matter—often turns on the existence (or not) 
of a cause of action.11  For instance, if Congress creates a right by 
enacting Statute X and then declares that “persons aggrieved by 
violations of Statute X may sue any state responsible for the violation,” 
federal courts typically conclude that a state’s sovereign immunity has 
been abrogated.12 This is reasonable in my view because, if sovereign 
immunity is an immunity from suit (not just liability), then a statute that 
authorizes a suit signals Congress’s desire that states have no immunity 
with regard to Statute X. The same logic applies when a state consents 
to suit (usually in exchange for federal funds)13 or the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 43. 
 9. Id. at 44 (quoting Preis, supra note 1, at 886).   
 10. See Preis, supra note 1, at 887–90. 
 11. Id. at 890–92 (discussing the relationship between federal causes of action and 
sovereign immunity). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (holding that, “insofar as 
Title II [of the Americans with Disabilities Act] creates a private cause of action for damages 
against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity.”). 
 13. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657–58 (2011) (analyzing scope of cause of 
action against Texas to determine whether Texas waived its sovereign immunity). 
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government waives its own sovereign immunity.14 In both of those 
situations, it is the cause of action that signifies the consent or waiver.  
Based on these circumstances, I criticized the Supreme Court’s 
frequent assertion that the “cause of action does not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction.”15  In cases of abrogation, consent or waiver, the 
existence of sovereign immunity (and thus subject matter jurisdiction) 
often does turn on the existence of a cause of action.16 To be sure, the 
creation of a cause of action is not the only way that sovereign 
immunity might disappear, but it is a common way and Congress, of 
course, is free to dictate whether and how the two concepts shall be 
linked.  
Mulligan sees the matter differently. For him, the cause of action, to 
the extent it sometimes overlaps with sovereign immunity, does not 
render the cause of action jurisdictional. This is because sovereign 
immunity is, in his words, “a defense with jurisdictional implications.”17 
What I take Mulligan to be arguing is that, because causes of action are 
normally plead by plaintiffs, and the absence of sovereign immunity is 
not normally plead by plaintiffs, it follows that the two are not related.  
Mulligan is correct that sovereign immunity is a defense that, if 
accepted by the court, will result in a jurisdictional dismissal. I believe 
he is incorrect, however, in insisting that the defensive context in which 
the immunity issue is raised means that that issue is not related to the 
cause of action. It is irrelevant, in my mind, how the sovereign 
immunity issue arises.  
Consider, for example, a suit against the federal government. To sue 
the government, one must locate a wavier of immunity.18 One such 
waiver is found at 5 U.S.C. § 702.  Importantly, § 702 also creates a 
cause of action. The relevant language is as follows: 
 A person suffering legal wrong [owing to federal agency 
action] is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a 
court of the United States seeking relief other than money 
damages . . . shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be 
denied on the ground that it is against the United States . . . 
.19 
 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191 (1996) (in damages action to enforce the 
Rehabilitation Act, analyzing the cause of action used to enforce the Act to determine whether 
the cause of action “establish[es] a waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity 
against monetary damages awards for violations”).   
 15. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002). 
 16. Preis, supra note 1, at 891. 
 17. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 43.   
 18. See Preis, supra note 1, at 909. 
 19. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
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Suppose that a plaintiff brings suit against a federal agency. The 
agency files a motion to dismiss making two arguments. First, the 
agency argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 
the agency, as an arm of the federal government, is entitled to sovereign 
immunity. Second, the agency argues that the plaintiff’s claim must be 
dismissed on the merits because she lacks a cause of action. The 
plaintiff responds to both arguments by pointing to a single provision: § 
702. That section, the plaintiff argues, waives sovereign immunity by 
authorizing her to sue the government. In fact, the authorization of suit 
is how immunity has been waived. On these facts, the court should deny 
the government’s motion to dismiss and explain that § 702 defeats both 
arguments for dismissal. Because § 702 provides the plaintiff with a 
cause of action and provides the court with jurisdiction, it follows that, 
in sovereign immunity cases at least, the cause of action can, and often 
does, implicate subject matter jurisdiction. This conclusion, moreover, 
is completely unaffected by the fact that the sovereign immunity issue 
was raised as a defense rather than plead by the plaintiff.   
Of course, one could argue that referring to § 702 as a “single 
provision” is artificial. The statutory provision, it might be said, actually 
contains two separate statements: The first statement, by authorizing 
“judicial review,” creates a cause of action, and the second, by directing 
that such suits “shall not be dismissed,” waives sovereign immunity. 
More to the point, if Congress were to separate the two provisions into § 
702 and § 703, one could hardly argue that the cause of action in § 702 
also created subject matter jurisdiction.   
I agree, but this argument does not defeat my central claim, which is 
that Congress, if it desires, can make causes of action jurisdictional. 
Congress’s frequent practice in the realm of sovereign immunity is to 
link the two,20 but the inquiry will always be one of statutory 
interpretation. Reasonable people can differ about whether the two 
provisions of § 702 are inextricably linked or simply separate concepts 
couched in the same section.  If the first provision ended in a semi colon 
or a comma, the connection between the two provisions might be 
strengthened. Similarly, if the second provision was never enacted, 
courts might reasonably conclude—as they have before—that the first 
provision implicitly addressed sovereign immunity on its own.21  One 
need not agree with any of these interpretations to agree with the core of 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Preis, supra note 1, at 890–92. 
 21. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that 
sovereign immunity was offended by Congress’s attempt, in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, to “authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States”); see also 
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (analyzing the Rehabilitation Act’s cause of action to 
determine whether “the Federal Government's [waiver of] sovereign immunity [was] 
unequivocally expressed in statutory text”).   
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my claim, however; one need only accept that, at some point, the text 
will be clear enough for a court to conclude that a single provision both 
creates a cause of action and jurisdiction. 
II.  THE CAUSE OF ACTION AND REMEDIES 
Professor Mulligan also takes issue with my claim about the 
relationship between the cause of action and remedies.22 In my article, I 
criticized the Court’s frequent statement that “the question whether a 
litigant has a cause of action is analytically distinct and prior to what 
relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.”23 In response to this, 
I demonstrated that when a federal court asks whether a cause of action 
exists, it is in fact asking whether a particular remedy is available. Take, 
for example, Bivens actions.24 When a court considers whether to imply 
a Bivens action, it is in fact asking whether a plaintiff ought to be able to 
obtain damages for the harm alleged.25 It is impossible to read the 
Court’s Bivens cases and conclude that “what relief, if any, a litigant 
may be entitled to receive” has no role to play.26  Based on this and 
other examples, I argued that the “cause of action has been, and remains 
today, remedy-specific.”27 That is, “a plaintiff may have a cause of 
action for injunctive relief but not damages.”28   
This claim got Mulligan’s attention.  He agrees that, in the field of 
constitutional rights, causes of action are often tied to a particular type 
of remedy. But he thinks my point is too strong when it comes to causes 
of action to enforce statutory rights. “[O]nce one ventures beyond the 
rarified air of constitutional torts,” Mulligan argues, “one finds that the 
Court often applies the maxim [that when a] . . . federal statute provides 
for a general right to sue . . . , federal courts may use any available 
remedy to make good the wrong done.”29 Mulligan’s point, as I read it, 
is that causes of action are sometimes silent on which remedies can 
issue and that, when they are, courts can and do assume that they have 
the power to issue whichever remedy seems appropriate. If this is true, 
then it can hardly be said that causes of action are “remedy specific.” 
Mulligan is correct in part. He is undoubtedly correct that causes of 
action do not always specify a particular remedy and that, when the 
cause of action is silent on the matter of remedy, federal courts are left 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 44. 
 23. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 25. Id. at 388. 
 26. Davis, 442 U.S. at 239. 
 27. Preis, supra note 1, at 886.   
 28. Id.   
 29. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 44 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
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to determine on their own the appropriate remedy. Thus, to the extent 
that my article implies that every cause of action is remedy specific, I 
overstated the case. But I think Mulligan overstates his case as well. I 
do not think that the Court “often” finds statutory causes of action silent 
on the issue of which remedies are available. Indeed, I think that 
situation is quite uncommon. 
Consider, for example, Sossamon v. Texas.30 The question presented 
in Sossamon was whether a plaintiff could pursue a damages action 
against a state for a violation of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).31 The case turned on the 
interpretation of the following cause or action: “A person may assert a 
violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding 
and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”32 
The question for the Court was whether the words “appropriate 
relief” in the cause of action included damages. The plaintiff argued that 
a damages action was permissible because, as stated in Bell v. Hood, 
when a “federal statute provides for a general right to sue . . . , federal 
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.’”33 
In other words, the plaintiff believed that the cause of action was silent 
on the issue of remedies.   
The Court explicitly rejected that argument. The statute was not 
silent on the issue of remedies.34  Indeed, the statute explicitly spoke of 
remedies by authorizing “appropriate relief.”  Thus, the Court did not 
conclude it was free to “use any available remedy” but instead followed 
the text wherever it led. In this case, the Court reasoned that “the word 
‘appropriate’ is inherently context-dependent” and further that “[t]he 
context here—where the defendant is a sovereign—suggests, if 
anything, that monetary damages are not ‘suitable’ or ‘proper.’”35  
Sossamon illustrates how a cause of action that does not explicitly 
mention damages or injunctive relief can still speak to those matters.  
Put differently, Sossamon shows how rarely a cause of action will be 
deemed silent on the issue of remedies. Causes of action that speak of 
“appropriate relief” are common and the Supreme Court has interpreted 
these causes of action with traditional tools of statutory interpretation, 
rather than assumed that they offer the court a blank slip to issue 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).   
 31. Id. at 1655. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a). 
 33. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) 
 34. Sossamon, 131 S. Ct at 1651 (stating that a court’s authority to issue any available 
remedy only arises when there is no text to interpret).   
 35. Id. at 1659. Absent waiver or abrogation, states are not suable in federal court for 
monetary relief. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672–73. (1974). 
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whatever remedy it might conjure up.36 
Of course causes of action may not always contain a textual 
reference to a particular form of relief.  Implied causes of action, by 
their very nature, do not have a textual basis (though these are often 
remedy-specific nonetheless).37 And it is at least possible that Congress, 
instead of stating that a plaintiff “may bring suit for any appropriate 
relief,” could simply state “may bring suit.” This is why I stated at the 
outset that I “mostly” stand by my claim that causes of action are 
remedy specific. So while it is inappropriate to say that every federal 
cause of action portends the existence of specific type of remedy (or 
remedies), it is fair to say that this is true in the large majority of cases.  
CONCLUSION 
I have spent several pages disagreeing with Mulligan on some minor 
points.  As I close, it is important to emphasize what we agree on, which 
is that the Supreme Court has not articulated a coherent conception of 
the federal cause of action. This failure has led to numerous problems, 
confusions, and doctrinal mistakes. Our hope is that scholarship on this 
issue—including not only my own, but his as well38—will persuade 
jurists of the need for reform in this field. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 374–75 
(1990) (holding that a cause of action for “appropriate relief” provided by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act did not permit the court to create a construction trust 
because it would violate “ERISA’s prohibition on the alienation of pension benefits”); Mass. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142, 144 (1985) (in ERISA case, holding that 
plaintiff may not recover certain compensatory and punitive damages even though the ERISA 
cause of action authorized suit for “appropriate relief”; to interpret the cause of action otherwise 
would render “superfluous the preceding clauses providing [other types of relief]”); Sch. Comm. 
of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (holding that 
Education of the Handicapped Act’s order that courts “grant such relief as [it] determines is 
appropriate” should be interpreted “in light of the purpose of the Act”). 
 37. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (creating a cause of action against federal officers only for monetary relief).   
 38. Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1667 (2008). 
